Co-Worker Morale, Confidentiality, and the Americans with Disabilities Act by Key, Lisa E.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 46 
Issue 4 Summer 1997: Symposium - Individual 
Rights and Reasonable Accommodations under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act 
Article 7 
Co-Worker Morale, Confidentiality, and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act 
Lisa E. Key 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Lisa E. Key, Co-Worker Morale, Confidentiality, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 DePaul L. Rev. 
1003 (1997) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol46/iss4/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
CO-WORKER MORALE, CONFIDENTIALITY, AND
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
Lisa E. Key*
INTRODUCTION
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act1 ("ADA") requires
covered employers2 to make reasonable accommodations to the
known physical and mental limitations of an otherwise qualified indi-
vidual with a disability who is either an applicant or an employee.3
Thus, although the ADA does not require an employer to take affirm-
ative action-an employer is not required to hire a person with a disa-
bility if there is another applicant who is more qualified 4-an
employer cannot prefer or select an individual who does not have a
disability over an equally qualified individual with a disability merely
because the individual with a disability will require a reasonable ac-
commodation.5 In other words, an employer may not consider an in-
dividual's need for a reasonable accommodation in making
employment decisions. 6 An employer is only relieved of the duty to
make a reasonable accommodation if the accommodation would im-
pose an undue hardship on the operation of the employer's business. 7
This Article addresses the question of whether the effect of an accom-
modation on the morale of co-workers should be considered in deter-
mining whether the accommodation will impose an undue hardship on
an employer.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia; B.S.W. 1984, University of
Illinois; J.D. 1987, Northwestern University. The author is grateful to Chantel Kelly and Doug-
las Worley for their invaluable research assistance.
This Article is based on a presentation given on January 31, 1997, at Depaul Law Review's
Symposium entitled Individual Rights and Reasonable Accommodations Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (1994).
2. Covered employers are those engaged in an industry affecting commerce and who have
fifteen or more employees. Id. § 12111(5)(A).
3. See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
4. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 55-56 (1990); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 26-27 (1989).
5. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9(b) (1996).
6. Id.
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
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Part I of this Article begins by examining factors that affect em-
ployee morale.8 This part then explores the legitimacy of an em-
ployer's desire to maintain high employee morale by considering the
likely effects of a loss in morale on an employer's business.9 Finally,
Part I briefly considers possible effects that accommodations under
the ADA could have on co-worker morale. 10
Because there is little case law under the ADA addressing the issue
of co-worker morale, Parts II and III of this Article examine the role
that co-worker morale has played in other antidiscrimination stat-
utes.'I Part II begins with an analysis of co-worker morale under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196412 ("Title VII"). 13 The section first
considers how co-worker rights impact the fashioning of remedies
under Title VII generally.14 Part II continues with an examination of
cases in which an employee alleged discrimination based on an em-
ployer's failure to make reasonable accommodations to religious
needs.15 These cases are significant because Title VII places an obli-
gation on employers that is similar to an employer's obligation under
the ADA. As with the ADA, Title VII requires employers to make
reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of employees un-
less doing so would cause an undue hardship. 16
Part III of this Article analyzes cases decided under the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 197317 ("Rehabilitation Act") in which co-worker morale
was a factor. t8 Like the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act prohibits dis-
crimination against persons with disabilities and requires covered enti-
ties to make reasonable accommodations for persons with disabilities
unless doing so would impose an undue hardship. 19 Its application,
8. See infra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
11. For a general discussion of the concepts of "reasonable accommodation" and "undue
hardship" and their historical roots, see Margaret A. Stine, Comment, Reasonable Accommoda-
tion and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 37 S.D. L. REV. 97
(1992).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17.
13. See infra notes 49-139 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 49-62 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 63-139 and accompanying text.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-2(a)(1).
17. 29 U.S.C. 33 701-797b (1994).
18. See infra notes 140-219 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1991) (regulation issued by Department of Health and
Human Services pursuant to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act providing that "[a] recipient
shall make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an other-
wise qualified handicapped applicant or employee unless the recipient can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program"); 29 C.F.R.
§ 32.3 (1989) (regulation issued by the Department of Labor pursuant to section 504 of the
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however, is limited to the federal government, federal contractors,
and recipients of federal funds.20 Cases decided under the Rehabilita-
tion Act are of particular import because the ADA was modeled after
the Rehabilitation Act and courts are to look to decisions interpreting
the Rehabilitation Act for guidance in interpreting analogous provi-
sions of the ADA.21
Part IV examines applicable provisions of the ADA and interpreta-
tions of these provisions by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") 22 to determine whether the decisions shed
any light on the proper role of co-worker morale in the context of
undue hardship.23 Part IV also discusses relevant case law under the
ADA.24 Part V of this Article sets forth a proposal delineating the
circumstances in which a loss of morale resulting from an accommoda-
tion would be an appropriate factor for courts to consider in determin-
ing whether the accommodation imposes an undue hardship.25 This
proposal adopts a balanced approach in which both the rights of the
employee with the disability and the rights of the employer are consid-
ered and, therefore, is consistent with the overall tenor of the ADA.
I. THE LEGITIMACY OF MORALE
A. What Is Morale and Why Should We Care If It Is Hurt?
Morale is not something one can touch, see, smell, taste, or hear.
Rather, it is intangible. It is an attitude, a sense of spirit. However,
morale is not invisible. Its existence is seen through the behaviors it
Rehabilitation Act defining a "qualified handicapped individual" as a handicapped individual
who meets both the eligibility requirements and valid job qualifications with reasonable accom-
modation and defining "reasonable accommodation" as "the changes and modifications which
can be made in the structure of a job .... or in the manner in which a job is performed ....
unless it would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the recipient's program"); 28
C.F.R. § 41.53 (1988) (regulation issued by the Department of Justice pursuant to section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act providing that "[a] recipient shall make reasonable accommodation to
the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or
employee unless the recipient can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of its program").
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794.
21. Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1047 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 65
U.S.L.W. 3647 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1997) (No. 96-7525); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 67
(1990) (noting that the concept of "undue hardship" is derived from and should be interpreted
consistently with regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 36
(1989).
22. The EEOC is authorized to issue regulations governing private employment discrimina-
tion. 42 U.S.C. § 12116.
23. See infra notes 220-47 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 248-54 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 255-77 and accompanying text.
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produces. If one were to observe a group of people that was charged
with performing a task, for example, one could probably come to a
conclusion regarding the morale of the group based on the conduct of
the group and the manner in which individuals interacted within the
group.
Webster's Dictionary defines morale as "the mental and emotional
condition (as of enthusiasm, confidence, or loyalty) of an individual or
group with regard to the function or tasks at hand" and "the level of
individual psychological well-being based on such factors as a sense of
purpose and confidence in the future. '2 6 This definition suggests that
a number of factors contribute to morale, including having a sense of
purpose and having confidence in the future. It also suggests that mo-
rale is tied to other attitudes, such as enthusiasm, confidence, and loy-
alty. In other words, if morale is high, enthusiasm, confidence, and
loyalty will likely also be high. If morale is low, enthusiasm, confi-
dence, and loyalty will likely be low.
A study of employees at Sears, Roebuck and Co. supports the idea
that factors such as an individual's sense of purpose and confidence in
the future impact morale.27 Based on data from a survey of over
36,000 employees, the study concludes that tangible factors, such as
level of pay, hours worked, and the physical working environment, did
not have as significant an impact on morale as intangible factors, such
as recognition of performance and fairness of treatment.2 8 Recogni-
tion of performance is clearly tied to a validation of one's sense of
purpose. Further, a person who does not believe that he or she will be
treated fairly will surely have difficulty maintaining confidence in the
future.
Theodore Caplow, a professor of sociology at the University of Vir-
ginia, reached a similar conclusion with respect to the link between an
employee's belief that he or she is being treated fairly and that em-
ployee's morale.2 9 Professor Caplow found that the manner in which
rewards and punishments are distributed in the workplace is critical to
the level of employee morale, with the perception by employees that
26. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 771 (1987).
27. See JAMES C. WORTHY, LEAN BUT NOT MEAN: STUDIES IN ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE
35 (1994). The Sears study was based on a survey that was completed by more than 36,000
employees between 1939 and 1942. Id. at 27. Each employee was given a "morale score" that
was derived from answers to a series of questions. Id. at 28. The morale score measured the
employee's attitude toward the company and toward his or her work. Id. The conclusions
reached by the study were based on an examination of differences between employees with high
morale scores and employees with low morale scores. Id. at 30-35.
28. Id. at 35.
29. See THEODORE CAPLOW, MANAGING AN ORGANIZATION 140-45 (2d ed. 1983).
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rewards and punishments are distributed justly being a key factor.30
Feelings of injustice are created when there are discrepancies between
how an employee expects to be treated and how he or she is actually
treated. 31 To create or maintain high morale, rewards and punish-
ments must therefore be both predictable and consistent with the level
of effort put forth, the amount of sacrifices made, the employee's or-
ganizational status, and the rewards and punishments received by
others. 32 Preventing disruptions or alterations in the expectational in-
terests and rights of employees is crucial. If it appears that an em-
ployee is not rewarded despite meeting performance criteria or,
conversely, if it appears that an employee is rewarded even though
performance criteria have not been met, morale will be hurt.33 As
Professor Caplow emphasized, it is the perception of injustice that is
most significant.3
A loss in employee morale can damage a business in a number of
significant ways. As the definition of morale in Webster's Dictionary
suggests, lowered morale can negatively affect the enthusiasm, confi-
dence, and loyalty of employees. 35 Lowered morale can cause in-
creased friction and decreased cooperation among co-workers,
increased employee lateness and absenteeism, and a higher employee
turnover rate.36 Each of these can result in increased costs to the busi-
30. Id. at 140-41; see also J. Stacy Adams, Toward an Understanding ofInequity, J. ABNORMAL
& Soc. PSYCHOL. 422, 424 (1963) (noting that feelings of inequity exist when a person perceives
that his job inputs and outcomes are obverse to what he perceives to be the inputs and outcomes
of another).
31. CAPLOW, supra note 29, at 142. For a general discussion of distributive justice and the role
that third-party managers play, see GEORGE CASPAR HOMANS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ITS ELE-
MENTARY FORMS 232-64 (Robert K. Merton ed., 1974).
32. CAPLOW, supra note 29, at 142-43. Professor Caplow notes that employees may receive
unequal rewards or punishments for nearly identical actions without creating a sense of injustice
as long as the unequal treatment is based on established policy and is completely predictable. Id.
at 142; see also HOMANS, supra note 31, at 269-72 (tying job satisfaction to concepts of distribu-
tive justice).
33. CAPLOW, supra note 29, at 142-43.
34. Id. at 141; see also Adams, supra note 30, at 424 (pointing out that how a situation is
perceived, and not necessarily the actual situation, is critical to feelings of inequity).
35. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
36. See CAPLOW, supra note 29, at 156-57 (noting that indicators of high morale include a
stable or declining turnover rate and levels of lateness and absenteeism that do not interfere with
the organizational program); RICHARD T. MOWDAY ET AL., EMPLOYEE-ORGANIZATION LINK-
AGES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COMMITMENT, ABSENTEEISM, AND TURNOVER 141 (1982) (noting
several studies that show a correlation between employee commitment and levels of tardiness,
absenteeism, and turnover); WORTHY, supra note 27, at 202-03 (finding that the concern of man-
agers in having good employee relations is in part driven by a desire to reduce friction and
promote teamwork); RONALD PAUL YUZUK, THE ASSESSMENT OF EMPLOYEE MORALE 38-39
(1961) (finding a correlation between job satisfaction and levels of absenteeism and turnover);
see also HOMANS, supra note 31, at 264. Professor Homans suggests that distributive justice is
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ness by requiring that additional time and money be spent on resolv-
ing conflicts, rearranging work schedules, and recruiting and hiring
replacement employees. 37 Thus, employers have a legitimate eco-
nomic interest in promoting and maintaining high employee morale.38
B. Accommodations and Morale
The ADA requires covered employers to make reasonable accom-
modations to enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform
the essential functions of a given job. 39 Because the determination of
what constitutes a reasonable accommodation is dependent upon the
job at issue and the specific limitations of the individual requiring the
accommodation,40 the statute does not mandate that certain accom-
modations be made. It does, however, list some of the more common
accommodations that may be required.41 The list includes: (1) mak-
ing existing facilities accessible to and usable by employees with disa-
bilities; (2) restructuring a job by reallocating or redistributing
marginal, nonessential functions of the job; (3) permitting part-time or
modified work schedules; (4) reassigning an employee with a disability
to a vacant position; (5) acquiring or modifying equipment; and (6)
providing readers or interpreters.4 2 The Interpretive Guidance issued
realized when rewards are in proportion to investments, that the realization of distributive jus-
tice leads to decreased friction in relationships, and that this in turn should lead to increased
efficiency. See id. at 269-72.
37. See MOWDAY ET AL., supra note 36, at 76, 154 (noting the administrative costs associated
with employee absenteeism and turnover).
38. Consequently, employers have a legitimate economic interest in creating a work environ-
ment that appears fair and in which the expectational interests and rights of employees are not
altered or disrupted. Some commentators and courts, however, have failed to appreciate the
correlation between the expectational interests and rights of employees and the costs to employ-
ers. See, e.g., Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1046 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that
an accommodation that would have violated the seniority system under a collective bargaining
agreement posed a conflict "not so much between the rights of the disabled individual and his
employer . . . , but between the rights of the disabled individual and those of his co-workers"),
cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3647 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1997) (No. 96-7525); Barbara A. Lee, Reasonable
Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: The Limitations of Rehabilitation
Act Precedent, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 201, 223-24 (1993) (arguing that under the ADA
the expectations of co-workers are irrelevant in determining whether an accommodation im-
poses an undue hardship on an employer because nothing in the statute suggests that the needs
of co-workers are a consideration).
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) (1996).
40. Id. app. § 1630.9.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994); see also 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o). The Interpretive Gui-
dance clarifies that the statutory list is not intended to be exhaustive and that there are many
other types of accommodations that, depending on the specific circumstances, may be consid-
ered reasonable. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9); see also 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (interpreting what is meant by
"job restructuring").
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by the EEOC describes additional accommodations that could be re-
quired, such as providing accessible transportation, reserving parking
spaces, and permitting guide dogs. 4 3 The possibilities are virtually
limitless.
The manner in which an accommodation can hurt the morale of co-
workers can be broken down into three categories. First, morale
might be damaged because of the animus, negative stereotypes, or un-
founded fears of co-workers. For instance, assume a company hires an
individual who has cerebral palsy and is in a wheelchair. 44 To accom-
modate that employee's disability, the company agrees to alter the
employee's work space to allow the employee's wheelchair to fit com-
fortably. A co-worker who has nearby work space becomes disgrun-
tled, not because of any direct impact either the person with cerebral
palsy or the accommodation is having on the co-worker's job, but
merely because the co-worker finds the person with cerebral palsy
"offensive."
In the second category, morale is hurt because an employee is re-
ceiving an accommodation that is perceived by co-workers as prefer-
ential treatment.45 There is no direct impact or actual hardship
imposed on co-workers. However, their expectational interests and
rights have been disrupted because it appears that the employee with
the disability is being rewarded despite not meeting established crite-
ria or in a manner that is contrary to established policy.
For example, assume that a company has established a policy that
working on a flex-time schedule is not permitted. Several employees
would prefer to work on a flex-time schedule and have made requests
to do so, but their requests have been denied. The company then
hires an individual who has a disability and whose medication makes it
impossible for him or her to function well in the morning. The com-
43. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o).
44. In each of the examples given, it will be presumed that the employee receiving the accom-
modation is an individual with a disability. Section 12102(2) of the ADA defines "disability" as a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, a record of such an
impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Major life
activities include caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). To be substantially limited in a major
life activity means to be unable to perform an activity that the average person in the general
population can perform or to be significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration
in which the activity can be performed in comparison to the average person in the general popu-
lation. Id. § 1630.20)(1).
45. See James G. Frierson, An Employer's Dilemma: The ADA's Provisions on Reasonable
Accommodation and Confidentiality, 1992 LAB. L.J. 308, 310 (noting that furnishing accommoda-
tions to employees with nonobvious disabilities without explaining the reason to co-workers will
potentially lead to complaints and decreased morale).
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pany agrees to accommodate this employee by allowing the employee
to come to work at whatever time he or she is able, as long as the
employee works a minimum of forty hours per week. Co-workers,
who are unaware of the employee's disability, perceive this as unfair
and unjust and, as a result, morale is hurt. In this situation, co-worker
morale is not damaged because of prejudice or lack of understanding.
The co-workers are not even aware that the employee working flex-
time has a disability. Rather, co-worker morale has been damaged
because of a perception of unfairness or injustice based on the infor-
mation available to them, and that perception has been caused by the
accommodation. It is irrelevant that the employees' perception is in-
accurate. As Professor Caplow stressed, it is not whether there is an
actual injustice that is significant, it is whether employees perceive
there to be an injustice. 46
In the third category, the accommodation has a direct impact on co-
workers.47 Not only is there an employee who appears to be receiving
preferential treatment, but, in addition, co-workers are either denied a
reward despite having met established criteria or are punished in spite
of compliance with established rules and policies. As with the second
category, the expectational interests and rights of co-workers are dis-
rupted, there is a perception of unfairness or injustice, and morale
deteriorates. 48
For example, assume that an unpleasant task, such as emptying and
scrubbing out garbage bins, is assigned to a particular category of em-
ployee. The employees within that category share the task equally by
rotating who is responsible for completing the undesirable job. The
46. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
47. This often occurs when the proposed accommodation conflicts with the terms of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement. Although this is the type of situation that can lead to lowered mo-
rale, this Article will not focus specifically on the issue of the relationship between the ADA and
collective bargaining agreements. For articles discussing this relationship, see R. Bales, Title I of
the Americans with Disabilities Act. Conflicts Between Reasonable Accommodation and Collec-
tive Bargaining, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 161 (1992); Joanne Jocha Ervin, Reasonable Ac-
commodation and the Collective Bargaining Agreement Under the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990, 3 DET. C.L. REV. 925 (1991); Ann C. Hodges, The Americans with Disabilities Act in the
Unionized Workplace, 48 U. MIAM L. REV. 567 (1994); Eric H.J. Stahlhut, Playing the Trump
Card: May an Employer Refuse To Reasonably Accommodate Under the ADA by Claiming a
Collective Bargaining Obligation, 9 LAB. LAw. 71 (1993); David S. Doty, Comment, The Impact
of Federal Labor Policy on the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Collective Bargaining
Agreements in a New Era of Civil Rights, 1992 BYU L. REV. 1055; and Barbara Kamenir Fran-
kel, Comment, The Impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 on Collective Bargain-
ing Agreements, 22 Sw. U. L. REV. 257 (1992).
48. See Rosalie K. Murphy, Note, Reasonable Accommodation and Employment Discrimina-
tion Under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1607, 1632 (1991)
(acknowledging that some accommodations will require reassignment of unpleasant tasks, which
may cause feelings of unfairness).
1010 [Vol. 46:1003
1997]CO-WORKER MORALE, CONFIDENTIALITY & ADA 1011
company hires an employee who can perform all the essential func-
tions of the job but who, because of a degenerative muscle disorder, is
unable to perform the task of emptying and scrubbing out the garbage
bins. As an accommodation, the company relieves the employee with
the disability of the obligation to perform this task which the company
has determined to be marginal and nonessential to the job. Conse-
quently, each of the other employees in this job category are required
to perform this unpleasant task more frequently. This is perceived as
an undeserved punishment. In addition, the employee receiving the
accommodation, who is not required to perform the unpleasant task at
all, is perceived as being given an undeserved reward.
II. COMPLIANCE WITH TITLE VII AND EFFECTS ON
Co-WORKER MORALE
A. In General
In most instances, compliance with Title VII is mandatory regard-
less of the cost to the employer and regardless of the effect on co-
worker morale.49 This result is logical because compliance with Title
VII will rarely have a direct impact on co-workers jobs or job-related
rights. Thus, any resulting negative effect on morale is most probably
the result of animus, prejudice, or negative stereotypes.
In those cases in which compliance with Title VII would have a di-
rect impact on the legitimate rights of co-workers, the United States
Supreme Court has held that those rights may be taken into account
in fashioning an equitable remedy.50 Although these cases do not
speak in terms of loss of morale-and there is no reason why they
should because the cost to an employer of compliance is irrelevant
under Title VII-the cases do recognize that the elimination of dis-
crimination can have an impact on the rights and interests of co-work-
ers and that this impact is legitimate and should not be ignored.5 '
49. An employer is allowed to hire individuals on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin
if such a characteristic is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the nor-
mal operations of the employer's business. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). Even under these circum-
stances, however, an employer may not refuse to hire an individual because of the preferences of
co-workers. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(iii). One exception to this general rule is made in
connection with religious observances. An employer is required to make accommodations for
the religious observances of an employee only to the extent that doing so would not impose an
undue hardship on the employer's business. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); id. § 2000e-2(a)(1). This is
discussed in more detail infra notes 63-139 and accompanying text.
50. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 239-40 (1982); International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 374-75 (1977).
51. Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 239-40; International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 374-75.
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For example, in Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, Ford was sued under
Title VII for gender discrimination.5 2 The plaintiffs, all female, had
applied for jobs at Ford and alleged that they were not hired because
of their gender.5 3 Ford attempted to toll its liability for back pay in
the event that the suit was successful by offering the plaintiffs the jobs
that they had previously been denied.5 4 Ford refused to grant the
plaintiffs seniority retroactive to the time of the alleged discrimina-
tion, however.55 The question before the Court was whether, under
Title VII, an employer's failure to offer retroactive seniority precludes
the tolling of back pay liability.56
The Court held that Ford had effectively tolled its back pay liability
despite not having offered the plaintiffs retroactive seniority.5 7 In sup-
port of its decision, the Court acknowledged the importance of senior-
ity rights58 and emphasized the burden that a rule conditioning the
tolling of back pay liability on a job offer that included retroactive
seniority would impose on innocent employees.5 9 The Court explicitly
stated that it is permitted to consider the rights of innocent third par-
ties, such as existing employees, in deciding an employer's obligations
under Title VII.6°
The Court's decision in Ford Motor Co. does not mean that the
rights and interests of innocent third parties always outweigh the
rights of people who have suffered discrimination. 61 However, if im-
plementation of an equitable remedy under Title VII will impinge on
the rights and expectations of nonvictim employees, the harm it will
cause may be taken into consideration. As the Court stated in Inter-
52. Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 223.
53. Id. at 221-22.
54. Id. at 222-23.
55. Id. at 222.
56. Id. at 220.
57. Id. at 230-34.
58. Id. at 239. The Court noted that seniority can play a central role in deciding how to
allocate the benefits and burdens of employment among employees, including decisions involv-
ing promotion, layoff, transfer, vacation days, and shift assignments. Id. at 239 n.28.
59. Id. at 239.
60. Id. The Court's language in this regard could arguably be read narrowly to apply only in
those circumstances where plaintiffs have alleged, but not yet proven, discrimination. For in-
stance, the Court stated that "we should be wary of any rule that encourages job offers that
compel innocent workers to sacrifice their seniority to a person who has only claimed, but not
yet proved, unlawful discrimination." Id. at 240. However, the Court, in its analysis, cited favor-
ably to City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 722-23 (1978), in
which the Court refused to order a Title VII remedy that would significantly harm innocent third
parties even though discrimination was proven. Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 239.
61. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 777-78 (1976) (finding an award of
retroactive seniority to plaintiffs who proved discrimination appropriate despite impact on inno-
cent employees).
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national Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, "courts must 'look
to the practical realities and necessities inescapably involved in recon-
ciling competing interests,' in order to determine the 'special blend of
what is necessary, what is fair, and what is workable." 62
The importance of these decisions with respect to the ADA and co-
worker morale is twofold. First, these decisions recognizethat elimi-
nation of discrimination, although an important goal, does not always
override competing interests even under Title VII. There are times
when it is too much to expect affected parties merely to be under-
standing. Second, and more importantly, these decisions signify an
acknowledgment by the courts that co-workers have rights and inter-
ests that are both legitimate and significant and that these rights and
interests may be affected, often negatively, in the process of eliminat-
ing discrimination. This is as true with respect to accommodations re-
quired by the ADA as it is for remedies imposed by Title VII. Thus, it
is possible that a loss in morale occasioned by a remedy imposed on
an employer under Title VII or an accommodation made by an em-
ployer under the ADA may be the result of something other than ani-
mus or a lack of understanding on the part of co-workers. It may be
the result of employees not being given what established policies indi-
cate they should receive and the resulting perception of unfairness
and injustice.
B. Cases Involving Religious Needs
The provisions of Title VII that most closely resemble the ADA are
those governing the obligations of employers with respect to the reli-
gious needs of employees. Title VII requires employers to make a
reasonable accommodation to an employee's religious observance or
practice unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the em-
ployer's business.63 Although the statutory requirements of Title VII
and the ADA have virtually identical wording, there is one significant
difference between the provisions. The threshold for finding undue
hardship is much lower under Title VII than under the ADA.64 An
62. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 375 (1977) (quoting
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200-01 (1973)).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994); id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
64. Under Title VII, an accommodation that requires an employer to bear more than a de
minimis cost is deemed to impose an undue hardship. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977). The legislative history of the ADA specifically rejects the applicability of
the de minimis standard announced in Hardison in favor of a significantly higher standard. H.R.
REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 68 (1990); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 36 (1989). Likewise, the EEOC has
indicated that the undue hardship defense as used in the ADA is unlike the undue hardship
defense as used in connection with religious accommodations under Title VII in that an em-
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employer satisfies the undue hardship burden under Title VII merely
by demonstrating that an accommodation will require more than a de
minimis cost.65 In contrast, an employer must show substantially
more difficulty or expense to satisfy the undue hardship standard
under the ADA.66 Cases analyzing what constitutes an undue hard-
ship under Title VII are nonetheless relevant to the ADA, specifically,
for purposes of this Article, with respect to the question of whether
the effect of an accommodation on co-workers is a factor to be consid-
ered in assessing whether an accommodation will impose an undue
hardship.67
The leading case with respect to religious accommodations and un-
due hardship under Title VII is the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Trans World Airlines v. Hardison.68 The plaintiff in Hardi-
son made a request to his employer, Trans World Airlines ("TWA"),
to have the Sabbath off in accordance with his religious beliefs but was
refused.69 The plaintiff brought suit, claiming that TWA had discrimi-
nated against him on the basis of religion by failing to make reason-
able accommodations to his religious practices. 70
A collective bargaining agreement between TWA and the union
that represented TWA employees provided that preferences with re-
spect to shift assignments and days off were to be made on the basis of
seniority.71 In finding that the requested accommodation would cause
an undue hardship to TWA, the Court stressed that accommodating
the plaintiff would require depriving another employee of his or her
contractual rights under the collective bargaining agreement. 72 To al-
low the plaintiff his preference of not working on Saturdays would
mean requiring a more senior employee to work in his place, despite
the more senior employee's contractual right granting him or her a
preference over the plaintiff for not working on Saturdays. 73 The
Court stated that it "would be anomalous to conclude that ... Con-
gress meant that an employer must ... deprive [some employees] of
ployer must show substantially more difficulty or expense under the ADA than would be neces-
sary under Title VII. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d) (1996).
65. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84.
66. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 68; 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d).
67. See Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1049 n.12 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that
Congress, in rejecting the de minimis rule announced in Hardison, did not intend to reject the
overall holding of the case), cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3647 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1997) (No. 96-7525).
68. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
69. Id. at 67-69.
70. Id. at 69.
71. Id. at 67.
72. Id. at 80.
73. Id. at 81.
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their contractual rights, in order to accommodate or prefer the reli-
gious needs of others."' 74 While the Court in part relied on section
703(h) of Title VII,75 which affords special protection to bona fide sen-
iority and merit systems,76 the existence of section 703(h) was not crit-
ical to the Court's decision.77 What was critical was the interference
of the proposed accommodation with the bona fide rights of co-work-
ers, regardless of the source of those rights.78 The Court's decision in
Hardison thus provides a clear endorsement of the principle that the
effect of an accommodation on co-workers is a valid consideration in
determining whether the accommodation imposes an undue hardship
on the employer in the collective bargaining context.
Despite this endorsement in Hardison, the more specific question of
the role of co-worker morale in the undue hardship equation under
Title VII remains. In Cummins v. Parker Seal Co.,79 a case decided
before Hardison, the Sixth Circuit considered this question. The facts
were similar to Hardison; the plaintiff, after being fired for refusing to
work on the Sabbath, charged his employer with failing to make a
reasonable accommodation to his religious practices and observances
in violation of Title VII.80 The plaintiff was fired when co-workers
who were forced to substitute for him on Saturdays complained to
their employer.81 In analyzing whether not requiring the plaintiff to
work on Saturdays would cause an undue hardship, the Sixth Circuit
stated that "[t]he objections and complaints of fellow employees, in
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Section 703(h) provides that, notwithstanding anything else contained in Title VII, "it shall
not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of com-
pensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority or merit system .... provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)
(1994).
77. Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1049 n.13 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that the
structure and language in Hardison make apparent that the decision did not depend on section
703(h), rather, section 703(h) merely supported the conclusion already reached by the Court),
cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3647 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1997) (No. 96-7525).
78. Hodges, supra note 47, at 601-02 (finding that "[w]hile Section 703(h) was cited as support
for the Court's conclusion in Hardison, a close reading of the opinion indicates that the rights of
other employees, which were created in part by the collective bargaining agreement, were the
linchpin of the holding").
79. 516 F.2d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 1975).
80. Id. at 545. In contrast to Hardison, however, in Cummins there did not appear to be a
collective bargaining agreement or any other written agreement regarding the employer's policy
for assigning work on Saturdays. This factor was not specifically discussed by the court.
81. Id.
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and of themselves, do not constitute undue hardship. ' 82 The court did
not reject the legitimacy of considering effects on morale altogether,
however. In fact, the court conceded that it was possible for employee
morale problems to become so severe as to constitute an undue hard-
ship, but it stated that employee discontent would have to rise to the
level of creating chaotic personnel problems. 83
Two factors unrelated to the question of the relevance of co-worker
morale in the undue hardship equation were critical to the Sixth Cir-
cuit's decision, however. First, the court found that the employer
could have taken steps to alleviate the dissension among its employ-
ees, such as requiring the plaintiff to work on Sundays or requiring the
plaintiff to substitute for his co-workers on a more equitable basis. 84
Thus, the negative impact on co-worker morale was partially due to
the employer's actions and not the accommodation per se. Second,
the court was clearly applying a standard greater than the de minimis
standard later announced in Hardison. According to the court, to
show undue hardship, the employer must demonstrate that the accom-
modation would have a "dire effect" on the operations of its
business.85
Soon after its decision in Cummins, the Sixth Circuit again consid-
ered the issue of co-worker morale in Reid v. Memphis Publishing
Co. 86 In Reid, the court found that the proposed accommodation, not
requiring the plaintiff to work Saturdays, would create havoc and seri-
ous morale problems among co-workers. 87 Making the accommoda-
tion would have required co-workers with seniority to substitute for
the plaintiff on Saturdays.88 The burden of the accommodation on co-
82. Id. at 550; see also Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520-21 (6th
Cir. 1975) (refusing to find that accommodation would cause an undue hardship on the basis that
it might result in "grumbling" among co-workers).
83. Cummins, 516 F.2d at 550. The idea of an accommodation not being required if it would
"create chaotic personnel problems" arose out of an earlier Sixth Circuit decision. See Dewey v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 330 (6th Cir. 1970), affd by an equally divided court, 402
U.S. 689 (1971). In Dewey, the court found that the employer had not violated Title VII when it
fired the plaintiff for refusing to work on Sundays in contravention of a collective bargaining
agreement. Id. The plaintiff was allowed to arrange for replacements on his own, but his em-
ployer refused to arrange replacements for him. Id. The court stated that to accede to the
plaintiff's demands would "create chaotic personnel problems" and, therefore, it was not re-
quired. Id. At the time the action arose, however, the regulations did not speak of undue hard-
ship and were much clearer that an employer could require all of its employees to work on
Sundays without violating the statute. See id. at 329-30. It is unclear from this decision, there-
fore, whether "chaotic personnel problems" would rise to the level of undue hardship.
84. Cummins, 516 F.2d at 550.
85. Id.
86. 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975).
87. Id. at 521.
88. Id. at 516.
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workers was aggravated by the fact that there were only a small
number of other employees able to perform the work.89 Thus, the
effect of the accommodation on co-worker morale was relied upon by
the court in finding that the proposed accommodation would create
an undue hardship. 90
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Hardison, two courts
have had the opportunity to explore further the relationship between
co-worker morale and undue hardship.91 The Fifth Circuit addressed
the issue in Brener v. Diagnostic Center Hospital.92 The claim in
Brener, as in Hardison and Reid, involved an employee whose reli-
gious beliefs prohibited him from working on the Sabbath and a
number of religious holidays.93 In contrast to Hardison, however,
there was not a collective bargaining agreement or any other written
policy with regard to shift assignments.94 The plaintiff, an Orthodox
Jew, was one of five pharmacists employed by the Diagnostic Center
Hospital.95 The pharmacy operated seven days a week.96 On week-
days, four pharmacists were scheduled to work eight-hour shifts.97 On
weekends, one pharmacist was scheduled to work a twelve-hour shift
on Saturday and a fourteen-hour shift on Sunday.98 The pharmacists
met to arrange their own schedules. 99 It was their practice to rotate
shifts so that each pharmacist was scheduled to work every fifth
weekend. 100
The plaintiff, after being scheduled to work on a Saturday, ap-
proached the pharmacy director to ask him to order a trade of sched-
ules, which the director did even though it was contrary to his past
policy of not interfering with the pharmacists' schedules. 10 1 Eventu-
ally, the plaintiff arranged trades on his own for Saturdays by agreeing
to work more Sundays but requested the director to order trades on a
number of Jewish holy days for which the plaintiff would agree to
89. Id. at 515.
90. Id. at 521.
91. See, e.g., Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1996); Brener v. Diagnostic
Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1982); see also infra notes 111-24 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Opuku-Boateng); infra notes 92-109 and accompanying text (discussing Brener).
92. 671 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1982).










work Christmas holidays.'0 2 The other pharmacists began to complain
regarding the special treatment of the plaintiff and the director re-
fused to order any more trades on the plaintiff's behalf due to the
rising morale problems.10 3 The director indicated that the plaintiff
was free to arrange any trades he wanted on his own.' 04 The plaintiff
brought suit alleging that his employer had failed to make reasonable
accommodations to his religious practices. 0 5
The principal accommodation that the plaintiff was requesting was
that the pharmacy director order other employees to trade shifts with
the plaintiff.10 6 Despite the fact that the plaintiff's request did not vio-
late any written policy, the Fifth Circuit noted that it had resulted in a
disruption of established work routines and a lowering of morale
among the other employees when the proposed accommodation had
been tried in the past.10 7 The court found that this was sufficient to
cause an undue hardship on the employer. 10 8 To characterize the
complaints by the other employees as mere grumbling, according to
the court, was to underestimate the actual imposition on their work
environment.' 09
A slightly different result was reached on virtually identical facts by
the Ninth Circuit in Opuku-Boateng v. California.10 The plaintiff had
been appointed as a plant inspector at a border inspection station."'
There were fifteen inspectors employed by the station, which operated
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. 1 2 Although there was
not a collective bargaining agreement, departmental policy required
that work assignments be made as equitably as possible. 13 This
meant that all employees were required to work "an equal number of
undesirable weekend, holiday, and night shifts. 11 4 The plaintiff in-
formed his supervisor that he would not be able to work during the




105. Id. at 143-44.
106. Id. at 146-47.
107. Id. at 147.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 95 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1996).
111. Id. at 1465.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. Employees were also required to be assigned varying shifts to avoid collusion be-
tween inspectors and truck drivers. Id.
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place of the Sabbath assignments he would normally receive. 115 The
plaintiff was informed that his appointment would not be processed if
he refused to work on the Sabbath. 116
In refusing to find that the plaintiff's proposed accommodation
would cause an undue hardship, the Ninth Circuit observed that the
accommodation would not deprive other employees of any contractu-
ally established rights or privileges of any kind."17 More importantly,
however, was the fact that the proposed accommodation would not
have resulted in a privilege to the plaintiff or any real burden to the
other employees.11 8 The court stressed that in Hardison not all em-
ployees were required to work weekends; those with seniority were
permitted to take weekends off.119 Thus, requiring an employee with
greater seniority to work in Hardison's place on Saturdays would have
afforded Hardison a benefit and imposed a burden on the more senior
employee. 20 This was in contrast, the court said, to the situation
before it in which all employees were required to work an equal
number of undesirable shifts.' 2' As long as the plaintiff worked his
share of undesirable shifts, of which plenty were available on Sundays,
holidays, and nights, he would not be receiving any preferential treat-
ment nor would any cognizable burden be placed on his co-work-
ers.122 Thus, the court rejected the district court's finding that morale
problems with a significant impact could arise if the accommodation
were made and, instead, concluded that any hypothetical morale
problems that would arise were "clearly insufficient to establish undue
hardship."123
Although Brener and Opuku-Boateng appear to be at odds with one
another, both courts agreed that negative morale resulting from an
accommodation can be a factor in assessing whether the accommoda-
tion imposes an undue hardship. Both decisions also recognize that
depriving co-workers of rights or privileges, imposing a burden on co-
workers, or granting a preference to an employee requesting an ac-
115. Id.
116. Id.





122. Id. This presumes, of course, that working on a Sunday, holiday, or night is as undesir-
able as working on a Saturday. This question apparently was not raised and was not discussed by
the court.
123. Id. at 1473.
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commodation can lead to lowered morale.'2 4 The only issue on which
the decisions appear to diverge significantly is the circumstances
under which the damage to morale is legitimate-when have rights
and privileges of co-workers been deprived, when has a burden been
imposed on co-workers, or when has the employee requesting the ac-
commodation been granted a preference.
At first glance, it seems that the court in Brener required less of an
impact on co-workers to support a finding of undue hardship than the
court in Opuku-Boateng. In reality, this may not have been the case.
Assuming in Opuku-Boateng that the workers considered Sunday,
holiday, and night shifts to be at least as undesirable as Saturday
shifts, the court was absolutely correct in finding that the proposed
accommodation would produce no actual hardship to co-workers or
benefit to the plaintiff. All employees would still be working the same
number of undesirable shifts as they would if the accommodation
were not made. In addition, there was very little evidence presented
to the court indicating that morale would in fact suffer as a result of
the accommodation.12 5
In contrast, it is entirely possible that the accommodation proposed
in Brener would impose a significant burden on co-workers if imple-
mented. Absent the proposed accommodation, co-workers would be
required to work one out of every five weekends. If the accommoda-
tion was made, co-workers would have to work two out of every five
weekends. Although the employees would only have to work one day
per weekend (on Saturday), it is conceivable, if not likely, that this is a
less desirable working situation. If this were the case, then the court
in Brener was also absolutely correct in finding in that situation that
the proposed accommodation would cause an undue hardship. The
court's finding is further supported by the fact that the court had evi-
dence that when the accommodation had previously been tried, co-
worker morale suffered.
This analysis is also consistent with the Sixth Circuit's decision in
Cummins. As previously discussed, the court in Cummins first recog-
nized that lowered co-worker morale can be a factor in assessing
whether an accommodation will result in an undue hardship. 2 6 The
Cummins court then refused to find undue hardship, despite em-
ployee complaints regarding the accommodation, when it was possible
124. Although the court in Opuku-Boateng indicated that an employer has a stronger argu-
ment of undue hardship when rights or privileges are embodied in a contract, the court did not
opine that this is essential. See id. at 1470.
125. See id. at 1473-74.
126. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 1975).
1020 [Vol. 46:1003
1997]CO-WORKER MORALE, CONFIDENTIALITY & ADA 1021
to structure the accommodation in a manner that would not impose a
burden on co-workers or result in a preference to the employee re-
questing the accommodation. 127
A line of cases involving workers whose religious tenets prohibit
membership in or contributions to labor organizations provides fur-
ther support for this analysis. 128 The accommodation requested by the
employee in all of these cases was to be excused from having to pay
union dues. 129 In all but one case, however, the employee offered to
make a contribution to a charity in an amount equal to the union
dues.130 In the only case in which the employee also refused to make
a corresponding charitable contribution, Yott v. North American
Rockwell Corp., the employee's religious tenets forbade involuntary
charitable contributions as well as contributions to labor organiza-
tions.131 Employers, in raising an undue hardship defense, asserted
that making the accommodation would result in serious dissension
among co-workers. 132
The only case in which this argument was accepted was Yott.133 In
every other case, the courts rejected the employer's claim of undue
hardship. 134 As the Seventh Circuit pointed out in Nottelson v. Smith
Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806, the plaintiff who was requesting the
accommodation was not receiving a preference because he was bear-
ing the same financial burden as his co-workers.1 35 The court also
noted that the financial injury to co-workers and the union as a result
of the loss of the plaintiff's dues was minimal at best. 36 In contrast,
the plaintiff in Yott would have received a preference because his fi-
nancial burden would have been less than that of his co-workers, yet
he would still have received all of the benefits of union representation.
The court in Yott also noted that, in the past, when all workers had not
been required to belong to the union, there had been substantial ani-
127. Id.
128. See Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806, 643 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1981); Yott
v. North American Rockwell Corp., 602 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928
(1980); Burns v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1072 (1979); Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397 (9th Cir.
1978).
129. Nottelson, 643 F.2d at 448; You, 602 F.2d at 906; Burns, 589 F.2d at 405; Anderson, 589
F.2d at 399.
130. See Nottelson, 643 F.2d at 448; You, 602 F.2d at 907; Burns, 589 F.2d at 405; Anderson,
589 F.2d at 399.
131. You, 602 F.2d at 907.
132. Burns, 589 F.2d at 406; see You, 602 F.2d at 908-09; Anderson, 589 F.2d at 401-02.
133. You, 602 F.2d at 909.
134. Nottelson, 643 F.2d at 452; Burns, 589 F.2d at 406-07; Anderson, 589 F.2d at 402.
135. Nottelson, 643 F.2d at 451.
136. Id. at 452.
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mosity and friction among workers. 137 It thus found that the proposed
accommodation would result in discord and unrest and, as a result,
would create an undue hardship.13
Thus, in reviewing cases under Title VII involving accommodations
to religious practices, a trend is apparent. Courts have accepted that
such accommodations can impose on and interfere with the rights and
privileges of co-workers. Courts have also recognized that such ac-
commodations may hurt morale. Further, in those cases in which mo-
rale is hurt because an accommodation infringes upon the rights or
privileges of co-workers, imposes a burden upon co-workers, or grants
a preference to the employee requesting the accommodation, courts
have been willing to consider the effect on morale in determining
whether the accommodation will cause an undue hardship. Thus, the
courts, in effect, have treated these as legitimate causes of lowered
morale. This is in contrast to those cases in which morale had been or
would be hurt, but there was no evidence of any legitimate cause. In
these cases, courts refused to find undue hardship. Perhaps this indi-
cates a recognition by those courts that, to the extent morale had been
or would be hurt, the cause of the loss of morale must be something
that was not legitimate, such as prejudice or stereotypes, and that to
find undue hardship in those instances would be to contravene the
purpose of the statute.
III. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS, CO-WORKER MORALE, AND
UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE REHABILITATION AcT
The duties imposed on employers under the ADA are virtually
identical to those imposed on the federal government and federal con-
tractors by the Rehabilitation Act.' 39 For example, regulations
adopted under the Rehabilitation Act, like the statutory provisions of
the ADA, require covered employers to make reasonable accommo-
dations necessary to enable qualified persons with disabilities to per-
form all the essential functions of a particular job unless doing so
would cause an undue hardship.' 40 Furthermore, the legislative his-
tory of the ADA specifically directs courts to look to the Rehabilita-
tion Act in interpreting the term "undue hardship" as it is used in the
137. Yott, 602 F.2d at 909.
138. Id.
139. Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995).
140. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. For a general discussion of the judicial devel-
opment of undue hardship under the Rehabilitation Act, see David Harger, Comment, Drawing
the Line Between Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act. Reducing the Effects of Ambiguity on Small Businesses, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 783,
795-802 (1993).
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ADA.1 41 Thus, cases decided under the Rehabilitation Act are partic-
ularly persuasive in determining, under the ADA, what factors are to
be considered in deciding whether an accommodation will impose an
undue hardship. 42
As with Title VII, earlier decisions under the Rehabilitation Act
focused not on co-worker morale in particular, but on whether an ac-
commodation infringed upon the rights or preferences of co-workers,
imposed a burden on co-workers, or gave preferential treatment to
the employee requesting the accommodation. 143 For example, in
Treadwell v. Alexander, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether a
reasonable accommodation could be made for the plaintiff's heart
condition. 144 The plaintiff had applied for a job as a park technician
with the Army Corps of Engineers. 145 The job required that the em-
ployee be able to walk at least six hours a day and stand for another
hour.' 46 Because the plaintiff was only capable of walking a mile a
day, he was not hired.' 47 The court, in considering whether the reas-
signment of some of the job tasks to other employees would cause an
undue hardship, focused on the fact that only two to four other work-
ers were on duty at any given time. 148 According to the court, to re-
quire other workers to perform several job tasks normally assigned to
the plaintiff in addition to their own job tasks would impose an undue
hardship on the employer. 149
The decision in Carty v. Carlin150 was reached on similar grounds. 151
The plaintiff in Carty became disabled after working for the United
States Postal Service for a number of years.' 52 Because his disability
caused him to no longer be qualified to perform all of the essential
functions of his current position, he was discharged. 153 The plaintiff
brought a claim alleging that the Postal Service, by not transferring
him to another position for which he was qualified, failed to accom-
141. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 67 (1990); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 36 (1989).
142. See Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 542.
143. See, e.g., Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 467 (4th Cir. 1987); Jasany v. United States Postal
Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1251-52 (6th Cir. 1985); Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473,478 (11th Cir.
1983); Davis v. United States Postal Serv., 675 F. Supp. 225, 233-34 (M.D. Pa. 1987); Carty v.
Carlin, 623 F. Supp. 1181, 1188-89 (D. Md. 1985).
144. Treadwell, 707 F.2d at 474.
145. Id.
146. Id at 476.
147. Id. at 475-76.
148. Id. at 478.
149. Id.
150. 623 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Md. 1985).
151. See id. at 1188-89.
152. Id. at 1183.
153. Id.
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modate his disability.154 The Postal Service argued that the Rehabili-
tation Act did not require it to make such an accommodation. 5 5 At
the time, the regulations under the Rehabilitation Act did not specifi-
cally enumerate reassignment as a required accommodation. 156 In an-
alyzing whether such an accommodation was required, the court
specifically adopted the Supreme Court's approach in Ford Motor Co.
in which the Court cautioned against infringing the rights of innocent
employees when fashioning Title VII remedies. 157 The court found
that automatically reassigning the plaintiff to another position could
give the plaintiff a preference by eliminating his need to compete for
the position with other qualified employees and could also violate the
rights of co-workers provided in their collective bargaining agreement
with the Postal Service.1 58 Thus, the court concluded that the Postal
Service had no obligation to reassign the plaintiff.159
More recent cases decided under the Rehabilitation Act have spe-
cifically considered morale in the context of whether an accommoda-
tion imposes an undue hardship.160 One of the first of these cases,
Wallace v. Veterans Administration,61 involved a recovering drug user
who had applied for a job as a nurse in a hospital intensive care unit.
Her treating physician recommended that she be hired but that she be
restricted in access to controlled substances, in particular, injectable
narcotics, for a probationary period.162 The hospital refused to hire
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1184.
156. See id. at 1188. In 1992, regulations adopted by the EEOC under the Rehabilitation Act
were amended to require reassignment in some cases. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(11) (1992).
157. Carry, 623 F. Supp. at 1189 (citing to Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982)).
158. Id.
159. Id.; see also Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 467 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding no obligation to
assign the plaintiff to permanent light duty if it would interfere with rights of other employees
under a collective bargaining agreement); Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244,
1251-52 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that an employer has no obligation to restructure a job in a
manner that would usurp the rights of co-workers under a collective bargaining agreement);
Davis v. United States Postal Serv., 675 F. Supp. 225, 232-36 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (finding that an
employer is not obligated to assign an employee to another position when doing so would give
the employee preferential treatment over other employees and conflict with the terms of a col-
lective bargaining agreement); cf. Buckingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735, 741-42 (9th Cir.
1993) (finding that the rights of co-workers are not violated and, therefore, an employer is re-
quired to reassign an employee as a reasonable accommodation when a collective bargaining
agreement merely requires that one of every four reassignments be based on seniority).
160. See, e.g., Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1993); DiPompo v. West Point Mili-
tary Academy, 770 F. Supp. 887, 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Davis v. Frank, 711 F. Supp. 447, 455
(N.D. I11. 1989); Davis v. Meese, 692 F. Supp. 505, 515-16 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Wallace v. Veterans
Admin., 683 F. Supp. 758, 766-67 (D. Kan. 1988); Smith v. Brown, Agency No. OEO-94-0031,
1995 WL 329866, at *4 (E.E.O.C. May 24, 1995).
161. Wallace, 683 F. Supp. at 759.
162. Id. at 759-60.
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her on the basis that she was not able to perform all the functions of
the job, that is, she could not administer narcotics. 163 The hospital
claimed that it was not required to waive this job requirement be-
cause, among other things, staff morale would have been affected.164
The court did not dismiss the effect on morale as an illegitimate or
improper consideration. It did, however, find that the hospital had
not met its burden of proof in establishing a legitimate impact on mo-
rale and, therefore, the court rejected the hospital's claim.' 65 The only
evidence that the hospital had offered with respect to the effect on
morale of hiring the plaintiff was the testimony of a nurse who stated
that she did not believe that drug addiction was a disease and that she
would not like working with a restricted nurse.' 66 The court soundly
admonished the hospital, stating that "the V.A.'s refusal to accommo-
date is based on 'conclusory statements that are being used to justify
reflexive reactions grounded in ignorance and capitulation to public
prejudice." 1 67 The court concluded that the only reason the hospital
refused to hire the plaintiff was because it was "unenlightened and
uneducated," which the court found unacceptable.' 68
The employer in Davis v. Frank169 also tried to argue that it was not
required to make a particular accommodation because of the effect it
would have on co-worker morale. The plaintiff in Frank, who was
completely deaf, was employed by the Postal Service and had applied
for the position of time and attendance clerk.' 70 The Postal Service's
collective bargaining agreement provided that the position was to be
awarded to the most senior qualified bidder.' 7' The plaintiff was the
most senior bidder, but she was not awarded the position on the basis
that she was not able to answer the telephone.172 The court first
found that answering the telephone was not an essential function of
the job.' 73 The court then addressed whether accommodating the
plaintiff by excusing her from answering the telephone would impose
163. Id. at 760.
164. Id. at 766.
165. Id. at 767.
166. Id.
167. Id. (quoting Arline v. School Bd. of Nassau County, 722 F.2d 759, 765 (11th Cir. 1985),
affd, 480 U.S. 273 (1987)).
168. Id.
169. 711 F. Supp. 447, 455 (N.D. I11. 1989).
170. Id. at 448-49.
171. Id. at 449.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 454. There were two factors that influenced the court's conclusion. First, other
post offices did not require the time and attendance clerk to answer the telephone. Id. at 451.
Second, the duty of answering the telephone was added to the list of required job tasks for that
position for the first time when the vacancy arose for which the plaintiff applied. Id. at 449-50.
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an undue hardship on her employer. 174 Her employer argued that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship because it would
lower the morale of co-workers who, because they answer the tele-
phone on a rotating basis, would have to answer the telephone more
often.175 The plaintiff, however, had offered to do extra paper work to
make up for the fact that she could not answer the telephone. 76 The
court, in rejecting the employer's claim, stated that "the possibility of
lowered morale does not rise to the level of 'undue hardship.""u77
What the court meant by this statement is unclear, however. The
court may have meant that, in order to show undue hardship, an em-
ployer must demonstrate more than a mere possibility of lowered mo-
rale. The court may have meant that lowered morale, although
possibly a factor in the undue hardship assessment, is never enough on
its own to create an undue hardship. The court even may have meant
that morale was not a legitimate factor for consideration. The court
also may have meant nothing more than that, in the case before it, the
possibility of lowered morale did not rise to the level of undue hard-
ship. Each of these is a reasonable interpretation with the result being
that the decision offers little in the way of guidance.
The decision of the court in DiPompo v. West Point Military Acad-
emy 78 was more definite in its consideration of morale as a factor in
determining whether an employer is required to make a particular ac-
commodation. The plaintiff had severe dyslexia that resulted in his
having a reading level below the fourth-grade level and having a lim-
ited short-term recollection of numbers (five forward and three re-
verse). 179 The plaintiff applied for a job as a fire fighter but was
denied based on his low-level reading ability. 80 In defending its ac-
tions, the employer emphasized that each fire fighter was required, on
a rotating basis, to serve a tour on house watch, which entailed an-
swering the telephone, recording information in a daily log, and acting
as the department's dispatcher. 18' House watch was not considered a
desirable duty and was sometimes used as a disciplinary measure. 82
As an accommodation to his dyslexia, the plaintiff requested that he
Indeed, the court found that the list of required job tasks was modified for the explicit purpose
of preventing the plaintiff from obtaining the position. Id. at 452.
174. Id. at 454-55.
175. Id. at 455.
176. Id. at 451.
177. Id. at 455.
178. 770 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
179. Id. at 893.
180. Id. at 888.
181. Id. at 890.
182. Id.
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be excused from house watch duty.183 In evaluating the merits of the
plaintiff's claim, the court indicated that to put such a requirement on
the employer would ignore the effect of the requested accommodation
on morale and that it did not read the statute or regulations as impos-
ing such a requirement. 184 In reaching its conclusion, the court
stressed the possible damage to morale that would result if one fire
fighter were excused from a duty considered sufficiently burdensome
that it was used as a disciplinary measure.185
The court in Davis v. Meese186 also cited to morale as a basis for not
requiring an employer to make a particular accommodation. The
plaintiff in Meese, an insulin-dependent diabetic, sought employment
as either a special agent or investigative specialist with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). 187 The FBI enumerated several rea-
sons why it had a policy of excluding insulin-dependent diabetics from
both of these positions, which the court found to be rational based on
safety concerns and valid medical opinions.' 88 The plaintiff requested,
however, that as an accommodation he be assigned to limited duty so
as to avoid exposure to potentially dangerous situations. 189 While
agents were temporarily placed on limited duty from time to time,
there were no permanent limited-duty assignments available. 190 The
court found that such an accommodation would impose an undue
hardship. 191 The court's finding was based partially on the cost and
the financial constraints placed on the FBI.192 In support of its deci-
sion, however, the court also stated that hiring a person for a limited-
duty position would create a corresponding increase in the more rigor-
ous duties of other employees and that this would have a harmful ef-
fect on morale.' 93
The EEOC took a position consistent with DiPompo and Meese in
Smith v. Brown.194 The complainant, a nurse, claimed that she was
discriminated against on the basis of her disability, diabetes, when her
employer refused to schedule her for only the day shift.195 She
183. Id. at 891.
184. Id. at 894.
185. Id.
186. 692 F. Supp. 505, 515 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
187. Id. at 507.
188. Id. at 518.
189. Id. at 519.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 515-16.
193. Id.
194. Agency No. OEO-94-0031, 1995 WL 329866, at *4 (E.E.O.C. May 24, 1995).
195. Id. at *1.
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claimed that moving her from shift to shift could cause a disruption in
her daily routine that would be detrimental to her health. 196 The evi-
dence that the complainant offered regarding the detrimental health
effects, however, was questionable. 197 Her employer nonetheless at-
tempted to accommodate the complainant but subsequently discontin-
ued doing so, claiming that it was imposing an undue hardship, in part
because of resulting morale problems-co-workers had complained
that the complainant was being unduly favored. 198 The EEOC deter-
mined that, based on the questionable detriment to the complainant
as well as resulting scheduling difficulties and harm to morale, the em-
ployer was not required to make the requested accommodation. 199
Although it cannot be said that the harm to morale standing on its
own would have been enough to justify a finding of undue hardship, it
was clearly a consideration.
The most significant decision regarding co-worker morale and its
relationship to undue hardship, Barth v. Gelb,200 was rendered by the
District of Columbia Circuit in 1993. The plaintiff was an employee of
the Voice of America ("VOA"). 201 He suffered from an advanced and
degenerative form of diabetes that required the care of a skilled endo-
crinologist. 202 The plaintiff's job was located in Washington D.C., but
he wished to be admitted into the Foreign Service in order to work at
the VOA's overseas radio relay stations.20 3 His request for admit-
tance was denied, not because he was not qualified for the position,
but because he could only serve in those posts that had advanced
medical facilities. 204
The VOA maintained twelve overseas radio relay stations, of which
only three or four had facilities available that met the plaintiff's medi-
cal requirements. 20 5 Normally, employees were required to rotate
among the various posts. 20 6 The posts with advanced medical facilities
were more urban and were used as short-term havens from the more
remote hardship posts. 20 7 In rejecting the plaintiff's request to be as-
196. Id.
197. Id. at *4.
198. Id. All other nursing personnel were required to rotate through the evening and night
shifts. Id. at *1.
199. Id. at *4.
200. 2 F.3d 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1993).





206. Id. at 1188.
207. Id.
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signed only to the non-hardship posts, the VOA did not argue that the
plaintiff's request was unreasonable or that it would cause a funda-
mental alteration in the nature of its program.20 8 In fact, the VOA
often agreed to such assignments for existing employees in order to
accommodate their family or medical situations.20 9 Instead, the VOA
argued that granting the plaintiff's request would cause an undue
hardship to it.210
The District of Columbia Circuit, in reaching its decision, first found
a legitimate distinction between making accommodations to existing
employees, which it said would presumably contribute to morale, re-
tention, and productivity and making an accommodation for someone
who is not currently part of the "family," who is a "stranger. '211 Thus,
the fact that the VOA made accommodations similar to what the
plaintiff was requesting for its existing employees was not
determinative.
The court then addressed the VOA's argument that the proposed
accommodation would impair employee morale, thereby causing an
undue hardship.212 The plaintiff had responded to this argument by
asserting that it was inappropriate to take morale into account.213 As
support for his position, he cited to cases under Title VII in which the
hostility or animus of others was rejected as a defense to race-based
policies.214 The court pointed out that the plaintiff's position confused
animus against persons with disabilities with the damage to morale
that could be caused by an accommodation. 215 It gave as an example
an admittedly extreme situation-an employee with eyes that were
extra sensitive to light who requested as an accommodation that the
employer's entire operations be moved underground. 216 The court
stated that in assessing whether the request would impose an undue
hardship, any animus that co-workers felt toward the individual be-
cause of his disability would not be a proper consideration.217 The
court stressed, however, that this did not mean that effects on the mo-
208. Id. at 1187-88.
209. Id. at 1188.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1189.
212. Id. at 1189-90.
213. Id. at 1189.
214. Id. at 1189-90. In support of his position, the court noted that the plaintiff cited to Pal-
more v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984), among other cases. The Supreme Court in Palmore held
that a community's hostility towards mixed-race marriages was not a defense to a policy that put
mixed-race couples at a disadvantage in child custody disputes. Id. at 433-34.




rale of co-workers from having to work underground also should be
ignored. 218 The court concluded that the imposition of an accommo-
dation on co-workers and, thus, any resulting damage to morale, is a
legitimate concern under the Rehabilitation Act.2 19 The idea that
damage to co-worker morale can be caused absent animus and that
such damage is a legitimate factor in determining whether an accom-
modation imposes an undue hardship has therefore been wholeheart-
edly embraced by at least one court.
IV. Co-WORKER MORALE AND THE ADA
A. ADA Basics
Title I of the ADA requires covered employers to make reasonable
accommodations to the known physical and mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is either an appli-
cant or an employee. 220 Furthermore, the ADA prohibits an em-
ployer from considering the need of an otherwise qualified individual
with a disability for a reasonable accommodation in making employ-
ment decisions.221 An otherwise qualified individual with a disability
is someone who satisfies the prerequisites for the job, such as possess-
ing appropriate education, training, skills, or licenses and who, with or
without reasonable accommodations, can perform the essential func-
tions of the job.2 22 The purpose of requiring employers to make rea-
sonable accommodations is to eliminate discrimination against
persons with disabilities in all aspects of the employment relationship,
including hiring, firing, and promotion.223
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994).
221. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(B).
222. Id. § 12111(8); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1996). The essential functions of a job are those
that are fundamental and not merely marginal. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (1996). For example, a
function may be considered essential if the reason that the particular job exists is to perform that
function or if there are a limited number of employees to whom that function could be assigned.
Id. § 1630.2(n)(2). Whether a function is essential is to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Id. app. § 1630.2(n). In evaluating whether a particular function is essential, factors such as the
opinion of the employer, written job descriptions, the amount of time spent performing the func-
tion, the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, the consequences of not requiring the em-
ployee in question to perform the function, and the work experience of persons who previously
held the particular job or who currently hold similar jobs are to be considered. Id.
§ 1630.2(n)(3).
223. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 62, 65 (1990) (noting that an employer's obligation to
provide reasonable accommodations applies to all employment decisions and explaining that the
reasonable accommodation requirement is best understood as a process in which barriers to
employment are removed); accord S. REP. No. 101-116, at 31, 34 (1989); see also Jeffrey 0.
Cooper, Comment, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The Meaning of Reasonable Accom-
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An employer is only relieved of the duty to make a reasonable ac-
commodation if the accommodation would impose an undue hardship
on the operation of the employer's business.2 24 The concept of undue
hardship reflects a balancing of the profit-maximizing goals of busi-
nesses and society's goal of permitting individuals with disabilities to
work.22 5 "Undue hardship" is defined as meaning "an action requir-
ing significant difficulty or expense. '22 6 It is thus not limited to finan-
cial difficulties but includes any accommodation that would be unduly
costly, extensive, substantial, or disruptive or that would fundamen-
tally alter the nature or operation of the business.227 The statute pro-
vides a nonexclusive list of factors to consider in assessing whether an
accommodation imposes an undue hardship, including the nature and
cost of the accommodation, the number of employees, the financial
resources of the employer, the type of operations of the employer, and
the impact of the accommodation on the employer's operations.22 8
Although effect on co-worker morale is not specifically mentioned,
each of these factors could be said to be related to co-worker morale
in some respect.
modation and Undue Hardship in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1423,
1427-30 (1991). Mr. Cooper explains that a law prohibiting discrimination against persons with
disabilities that adopted a Title VII approach and merely prohibited the use of standards and
criteria that have a disparate impact on persons with disabilities, unless consistent with business
necessity, would only partially eliminate the barriers to employment faced by persons with disa-
bilities. Id. at 1428. Because a disability often legitimately affects a person's ability to perform a
job, more is needed to eliminate barriers to employment effectively. Id. at 1429. As Mr. Cooper
explains, although some disabilities may genuinely render a person unable to perform a particu-
lar job, a disability is frequently not as significant an obstacle to job performance as it may seem.
Id. In fact, a person with a disability may be perfectly capable of performing a particular job. Id.
It may simply be that the disability requires that the job be performed in a manner that appears
unconventional. Id. In recognition of this, the ADA, in order to eliminate discrimination
against persons with disabilities more effectively, has adopted the concept of requiring employ-
ers to make reasonable accommodations to allow a person with a disability to perform his or her
job. Id. at 1430.
224. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). For a general discussion of the undue hardship require-
ment under the ADA, see Cooper, supra note 223.
225. Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line: Determining When an Employer's Finan-
cial Hardship Becomes "Undue" Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L. REV.
391, 446-48 (1995).
226. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A).
227. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(p); accord H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 67; S. REP. No. 101-
116, at 35.
228. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B). Other factors to be considered are the overall financial re-
sources of the facility in question and of the entity as a whole; the effect of the accommodation
on expenses and resources of the facility; the number, type, and locations of facilities; and the
geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility in question to the
entity as a whole. Id.
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B. The Position of the EEOC
Examination of the Technical Assistance Manual ("TAM"), 22 9
which was issued by the EEOC as an aid in interpreting the provisions
of Title I of the ADA, reveals several clues as to the EEOC's position
on the relationship between co-worker morale and claims of undue
hardship. First, the EEOC opines that an accommodation can create
an undue hardship if it would be unduly disruptive to co-workers. 230
According to the EEOC, in assessing the level of disruption to co-
workers, the impact of the accommodation on the ability of co-work-
ers to perform their jobs is a valid consideration.2 31 Disruptions
caused by co-workers' fears or prejudices, however, are not valid con-
siderations.2 32 In addition, although the EEOC states that the impact
of an accommodation on co-workers may create an undue hardship, it
also states that "an employer may not claim undue hardship solely
because providing an accommodation has a negative impact on the
morale of other employees. '233
Thus, it is clear that the EEOC does not believe that negative ef-
fects on morale on their own can rise to the level of causing an undue
hardship. However, this does not mean that the EEOC believes that
effects on morale are precluded from consideration altogether. In
fact, the EEOC may simply be attempting to distinguish between le-
gitimate and illegitimate causes of lowered morale. In other words, in
those situations in which the cause of the lowered morale is legitimate,
such as when there has been an imposition on the rights or expecta-
tions of co-workers, any resulting claim of undue hardship would not
be based solely on lowered morale. Such a claim, however, would be
based on the imposition of the accommodation on the rights or expec-
tations of co-workers. Thus, a claim of undue hardship could be sup-
ported. If, on the other hand, making the accommodation results in
lowered morale but there is no evidence of any imposition on the
rights or expectations of co-workers, then the cause of the lowered
morale would likely be illegitimate, such as fears or prejudices. Any
resulting claim of undue hardship could be said to be based solely on
lowered morale since the EEOC is explicit that fears and prejudices of
229. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL
ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (1992) [herein-
after TAM].
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co-workers cannot be considered. Thus, the claim could not be
supported.
This analysis is consistent with the Interpretive Guidance issued by
the EEOC in connection with the regulations that it promulgated
under Title I of the ADA.234 The EEOC in the Interpretive Guidance
states that an employer would not be able to show undue hardship if a
disruption to its employees was the result of fears or prejudices to-
ward the individual's disability and not the result of the provision of
the accommodation. 235 Thus, if morale was damaged because the ac-
commodation placed a burden on co-workers, the effect on morale
would be a valid consideration. If, however, morale was damaged ab-
sent any burden being imposed on co-workers, the EEOC would
likely argue that the damage to morale was not caused by the accom-
modation but by animus toward the individual with the disability, and,
therefore, it would not be a valid consideration.
This interpretation is further supported by examples given by the
EEOC in the TAM as illustrations of the correct application of the
ADA. In one example given by the EEOC, an employee objects to
working with an individual with a disability because the employee
feels uncomfortable around or dislikes being near that individual.236
In this case, the EEOC notes that the employee's objections are obvi-
ously the result of fear or prejudice toward the individual's disabil-
ity.237 Thus, the EEOC concludes that the employee's objections do
not result in undue hardship.238 This is in contrast to another example
that the EEOC gives in which the accommodation creates a heavier
workload for co-workers. 239 The EEOC finds in this situation that
there is a possibility of undue hardship.240
A third example is slightly more difficult to interpret. In this exam-
ple, the EEOC states that if co-workers complain because an individ-
ual with a disability is allowed to take extra unpaid leave or to have a
flexible work schedule as a reasonable accommodation, such com-
plaints or negative reactions would not constitute undue hardship. 24'
However, as previously discussed, a perception that a co-worker is re-
ceiving preferential treatment can lead to legitimate feelings of unfair-









ness and injustice.242 Thus, any resulting lowered morale would be
legitimate and not in conflict with the policies of the ADA-it would
be caused by a disruption to expectational rights and interests, not
fears or prejudices. However, the example appears to presume that
the co-workers have knowledge of the reason for the preferential
treatment.243 If that is the case, then because employees should ex-
pect that their employer will make reasonable accommodations as re-
quired by the ADA, the accommodation is not a disruption of their
expectational rights or interests. If morale is nonetheless hurt, per-
haps the underlying cause is, in fact, fears or prejudices.244 Neverthe-
less, it is unclear whether the EEOC would find a possibility of undue
hardship even if it were presumed that co-workers had no knowledge
of the reason for the preferential treatment.
It may be that the EEOC believes that there should always be some
level of disclosure to co-workers regarding the need for an accommo-
dation as a means of alleviating morale problems associated with per-
ceptions of preferential treatment. Further in the TAM, the EEOC
states that employers should address problems of co-worker morale
and negative attitudes through appropriate consultations with supervi-
sors and by providing awareness training to managers, supervisors,
and co-workers. 245 The awareness training, the EEOC states, is to
help other employees overcome fears and misconceptions about disa-
bilities and to inform them of the employer's obligations under the
ADA.246 This type of awareness training will obviously only help to
eliminate morale problems in those situations in which co-workers are
aware that what appears to be preferential treatment is in reality a
reasonable accommodation being provided to an individual with a dis-
ability in accordance with the requirements of the ADA. If this is the
EEOC's sole solution for handling morale problems, then the EEOC
may implicitly be sanctioning some limited disclosure whenever an ac-
commodation is required. As will be discussed, 247 however, this may
not be consistent with the confidentiality requirements of the ADA,
which place some limits on the types of disclosures that are permitted.
242. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
243. But see 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d). In the Interpretive Guidance, the EEOC states that
an employer would be unable to demonstrate undue hardship even by showing that the provi-
sion of the accommodation itself has a negative impact on morale if the accommodation does not
impact the ability of co-workers to perform their jobs. Id. This appears to preclude the possibil-
ity of undue hardship resulting from a legitimate perception of preferential treatment.
244. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
245. TAM, supra note 229, § 3.9.
246. Id.
247. See infra notes 265-71 and accompanying text.
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C. Case Law Under the ADA
As of yet, no reported decision under the ADA has explicitly ad-
dressed the question of co-worker morale as it relates to undue hard-
ship. One decision, Milton v. Scrivner,2 48 did, however, consider the
impact of an accommodation on the working conditions of other em-
ployees. Milton involved two warehouse workers who were dismissed
from their jobs for failure to meet new production standards, which
required workers to accomplish their jobs in a shorter period of time
than previously required.2 49 The plaintiffs claimed that their inability
to meet the new production standards was due to disabilities, and thus
their terminations were in violation of the ADA.2 50 As an accommo-
dation, the plaintiffs requested either that they be held to an altered
or reduced production standard or that they be required to move only
lighter loads.2 51 The court found that the ADA did not require the
employer to do either of these things, although the basis for the
court's decision is unclear.252 The court mentioned that the proposed
accommodations would require the reassignment of essential job du-
ties and are, therefore, not required.25 3 The court further stated, how-
ever, that the accommodations are not required because they would
result in other employees having to work harder or for longer
hours.25 4 Nonetheless, the court did not consider whether any corre-
sponding harm to morale should also be a factor, and thus the decision
does not offer much concrete guidance.
V. A PROPOSAL
Based on the foregoing analysis of the law under Title VII, the Re-
habilitation Act, and the ADA, it is clear that, under some circum-
stances, the impact of accommodating an individual with a disability
on co-worker morale should be a factor in assessing whether the ac-
commodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer. The
circumstances under which such a consideration is appropriate, how-
ever, should depend on the cause of the lowered morale. In Part I of
this Article, the causes of lowered morale were broken down into
248. 53 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 1995).
249. Id. at 1120.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1124.
252. See id. at 1124-25.
253. Id. at 1124.
254. Id. (citing to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(v) (1996), which provides that the impact on the
ability of other employees to perform their duties is a factor in assessing undue hardship). The
court also noted that assigning lighter work loads to the plaintiffs would violate the employees'
collective bargaining agreement. Id.
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three broad categories: (1) co-workers' animus, negative stereotypes,
or unfounded fears toward the individual with the disability; (2) a per-
ception by co-workers that the individual with the disability is receiv-
ing preferential treatment; and (3) a direct imposition on the rights or
working conditions of co-workers.255 Each of these causes will be con-
sidered in turn.
The situation in which co-worker morale is damaged as the result of
animus, negative stereotypes, or unfounded fears on the part of co-
workers will be considered first.256 In the event that there is no evi-
dence of the damage to morale being caused by a perception of pref-
erential treatment or a burden being imposed upon co-workers, it
should be presumed that the cause is animus, negative stereotypes, or
unfounded fears.257 There are two reasons why any damage to morale
under these circumstances should not be a factor in assessing whether
an accommodation imposes an undue hardship.
First, it is not the accommodation that is causing the damage to mo-
rale.2s8 Even if the individual with the disability did not require an
accommodation, co-workers would probably be disgruntled. In fact, it
is co-workers' animus and lack of understanding, and nothing else,
that is damaging morale.
Second, animus, prejudice, and lack of understanding towards indi-
viduals with disabilities are exactly the types of attitudes the ADA was
designed to combat.259 Although employment of an individual with a
disability may cause some harm to the employer through loss of mo-
255. See supra notes 26-48 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
257. This is consistent with the trend noted under Title VII in connection with the religious
discrimination cases and with the decision in Wallace v. Veterans Administration, 683 F. Supp.
758 (D. Kan. 1988), decided under the Rehabilitation Act.
258. This distinction was recognized by the D.C. Circuit in Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1190
(D.C. Cir. 1993). See supra notes 200-18 and accompanying text.
259. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 28-30 (1990); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 5-7 (1989)
(finding a need for legislation prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabilities based
on examples of adverse actions taken against persons with disabilities that arose out of false
presumptions, generalizations, misperceptions, ignorance, and irrational fears); see also School
Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). In Arline, the Supreme Court held that the
determination of whether a teacher with tuberculosis was qualified for his job must be based on
objective medical evidence. Id. at 287-89. In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized
that the goal of the Rehabilitation Act is to protect individuals from deprivations based upon
prejudice, stereotypes, and unfounded fears. Id. at 287; accord Jansen v. Food Circus Supermar-
kets, Inc., 541 A.2d 682 (N.J. 1988). Jansen involved a question of discrimination under a provi-
sion of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4.1 (West Supp.
1996), a state statute that is very similar to the ADA. In finding that an employer had violated
the statute when it fired a meat cutter because of his epilepsy, the New Jersey Supreme Court
recognized that "unreasonable and unfounded fears of coemployees is not an exception to an
employer's obligation not to discriminate against a handicapped person." Jansen, 541 A.2d at
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rale, the root of the harm is based in hostile, negative, or uninformed
attitudes. To permit the loss of morale to be considered in determin-
ing the employer's obligations under the ADA under these circum-
stances would be to condone these attitudes implicitly. Such a result
would be nonsensical. 260
Morale can also be hurt because an employee is receiving an accom-
modation that is perceived by co-workers as preferential treatment.2 61
Although there is not a direct impact or actual hardship imposed on
co-workers in this second situation, their expectational interests and
rights have been disrupted. It appears to co-workers that the em-
ployee with the disability is being rewarded despite not meeting estab-
lished criteria or in a manner that is contrary to established policy.
Under these circumstances, co-worker morale is not damaged because
of prejudice toward or lack of understanding about the individual with
the disability. Instead, co-worker morale is damaged because of a per-
ception of unfairness or injustice. That perception is based on avail-
able information and has been directly caused by the accommodation.
Thus, in this situation, consideration of any resulting harm to morale
in assessing whether the accommodation imposes an undue hardship
would not conflict with the underlying policies of the ADA and should
be permitted.2 62 However, there is little, if any, support under the
ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or Title VII for allowing such
consideration.
A different conclusion should obviously be reached if co-workers
are aware that the individual who was perceived as being given prefer-
ential treatment had a disability and that what was perceived as pref-
erential treatment was actually an accommodation to that disability.
In this case, the expectational interests and rights of co-workers
should not be disrupted because employees should expect that their
employer will make reasonable accommodations as required by the
ADA. If co-worker morale is hurt despite knowledge of the reason
for the differing treatment, then it is likely that the underlying cause is
687 (quoting Jansen v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 518 A.2d 486, 490 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1986)).
260. This is consistent with the EEOC's position as spelled out in the TAM and the Interpre-
tive Guidance. See supra notes 232 and 235 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
262. But see Michael A. Faillace, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act Statutory Re-
quirements, Legislative History, Regulations, Technical Assistance Manual, Relevant Case Law
Under the ADA and 1973 Rehabilitation Act and Practical Recommendations, in 25m ANNUAL
INsTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW, at 159, 262 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 548, 1996) (arguing that although preferences given to persons with disabilities may
seem unfair or arbitrary by co-workers, this does not eliminate the need to provide the accom-
modation or constitute an undue hardship).
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in fact animus or lack of understanding.2 63 Assuming that this is the
case, the situation would fall within the first category, and costs to the
employer resulting from loss of co-worker morale should not be a fac-
tor in determining whether the accommodation imposes an undue
hardship.264
This raises the question of whether the ADA permits some limited
disclosure to co-workers. Prior to enactment of the ADA, an em-
ployer was under no obligation to keep confidential information re-
ceived regarding the medical condition of an employee. 265 Thus, if
such an obligation exists, it must be found within the statute itself. No
provision of the ADA generally prohibits disclosure of information
concerning the existence of a disability or the need for an accommo-
dation. Section 12112(d), however, permits employers to conduct
medical examinations and make inquiries regarding a disability only if
the employer agrees to treat any information obtained regarding the
medical condition and history of the employee as confidential. 266 Em-
ployers are permitted to make disclosures to supervisors and manag-
ers regarding any restrictions on the work or duties of an employee
with a disability or any other accommodations that may be neces-
sary.267 The statute does not explicitly allow disclosure to other af-
fected employees, however.
263. See Bonnie Poitras Tucker & Joseph F. Smith, Jr., Accommodating Law Faculty with
Disabilities, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157, 185-86 (1996). This article presents a hypothetical situation
in which an employee with a disability is permitted, as an accommodation, to work on a flexible
time schedule and suggests that if morale deteriorates it must stem from the co-workers' "inabil-
ity to understand the need for reasonable accommodations." Id. Although the authors do not
indicate whether the co-workers had knowledge of the reason behind the "preferential" treat-
ment, this must be presumed from their conclusion.
264. Accord Jenks v. Avco Corp., 490 A.2d 912, 917 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). In Jenks, the plain-
tiff, who was partially paralyzed below his waist, filed a suit alleging violation of the Penn-
sylvania Human Relations Act, 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 951-963 (West 1991 & Supp. 1996),
a state statute with requirements substantially similar to the ADA, when an employer refused to
accommodate his disability by providing him with a hydraulic cart. 490 A.2d at 914. The court
rejected the employer's argument that providing the plaintiff with a hydraulic cart would impose
an undue hardship on it because other employees would demand the same treatment. Id. at 917.
In this case, no disclosure of the fact of the disability or the need for an accommodation was
required because it was physically apparent. Therefore, any resulting hardship would necessarily
arise from either a lack of understanding or actual animus. Although the court did not discuss
these issues, its holding is consistent with the idea that it would be inconsistent with the purposes
of an antidiscrimination statute to excuse the employer's behavior under these circumstances.
265. Buchanan v. San Antonio, 85 F.3d 196, 199 (5th Cir. 1996); see also EEOC Guidance on
Preemployment Inquiries and Medical Examinations, Accommodating Disabilities (CCH)
91140,175, at 140,065-66 (Oct. 10, 1995) [hereinafter EEOC Guidance] (opining that an employer
is not required to remove from personnel files medical information obtained before the effective
date of the ADA).
266. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (1996).
267. Id. § 12112(d)(3)(B)(i).
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It is arguable that section 12112(d) does not prohibit general disclo-
sures regarding the existence of a disability and the need for accom-
modation as long as the specific nature of the disability is not
disclosed. 268 The strength of this argument depends on whether dis-
closure of nothing more than the fact that an individual has a disabil-
ity is considered disclosure of a medical condition. Unfortunately,
there is currently no guidance on this. Absent some indication to the
contrary, it would be risky for an employer to assume that such disclo-
sure is permitted.
It is also arguable that information obtained from an employee re-
garding a disability, other than through a medical examination or in-
quiry initiated by the employer, is not subject to the confidentiality
requirements. 269 The language of the statute supports this argument.
The confidentiality requirements are imposed specifically as a condi-
tion for allowing employers to conduct medical examinations and in-
quiries and are applicable only to information obtained from such
examinations and inquiries. 270 Thus, if an employer obtained informa-
tion regarding a disability from any other source, including a volun-
tary disclosure by the individual with the disability, the confidentiality
requirements should be inapplicable. The EEOC has indicated, how-
ever, that it believes the confidentiality requirements extend even to
information that an employee voluntarily discloses to an employer. 271
So again, it would be risky for an employer to assume that such disclo-
sure is permitted.
There is an obvious tension that needs resolution.272 On the one
hand, there is virtually no legal authority to support an employer's
claim of undue hardship if it is based solely on damage to morale
caused by a perception on the part of employees that a co-worker is
receiving preferential treatment. Yet, this damage to morale is legiti-
mate and can result in real costs to the employer. On the other hand,
it is far from clear that an employer would be permitted to alleviate
such a morale problem by disclosing to co-workers the reason for the
"preferential" treatment.273 As between the two, allowing limited dis-
268. Hodges, supra note 47, at 613.
269. Id. at 613-14.
270. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(1) (1996) (stating that
information obtained as part of an employment medical examination must be kept confidential).
271. EEOC Guidance, supra note 265, at 140,065.
272. See Frierson, supra note 45 (noting that the employers are put in a difficult position
because of the interaction between the reasonable accommodation requirements and the confi-
dentiality requirements and offering some possible solutions).
273. See id. at 312 (advising against disclosure as a remedy to morale problems because of
uncertainty of its legality). One practical solution is to obtain the consent of the individual with
the disability to the disclosure. Id. at 311. This is obviously only a partial solution, however. If
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closure may be more closely aligned with the purposes of the ADA. 274
While mindful of privacy concerns, we cannot expect co-workers to be
more tolerant and understanding of individuals with disabilities if we
shroud the existence of the disability and the need for accommodation
in shameful secrecy. The alternative of nondisclosure merely pro-
motes resentment and negative attitudes.
Finally, the third situation which can cause damage to morale is
when an accommodation has a direct impact on the rights or working
conditions of co-workers. Because of the imposition on innocent
third-parties, the first step should be to determine whether another
reasonable accommodation can be made that is less intrusive. If such
an alternative exists, the employer should be allowed to opt for the
accommodation that is the least intrusive upon co-workers. 275 For ex-
ample, assume an employee has poor night vision and is unable to
drive after dusk. The employee requests permanent assignment to the
day shift. All other employees are required to rotate shifts. Under
this proposal, because assigning the employee with the disability per-
manently to the day shift would impact the working conditions of co-
workers (by requiring them to work more afternoon and night shifts),
the employer could choose instead to arrange transportation for the
employee.
If no other accommodation is possible, then the scenario is similar
to that in the second situation where there is a perception of a prefer-
ence. However, because the accommodation directly impacts the
rights or working conditions of co-workers, it presents an even
stronger case that any resulting loss of morale should be a factor in the
undue hardship equation. In this third situation, even if co-workers
are aware of the reason for the accommodation, morale may nonethe-
less be damaged and the reason may have nothing to do with animus,
the individual with the disability does not consent, the employer is still left in a difficult position.
However, even if disclosure was explicitly permitted, employers should nonetheless consult with
the individual with the disability and attempt to obtain consent as to the specifics of the disclo-
sure prior to making any disclosure.
274. See Rose A. Daly-Rooney, Designing Reasonable Accommodations Through Co-Worker
Participation: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Confidentiality Provision of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 89, 90 (1993-94) (suggesting that the ADA's confidentiality
requirements "may actually impair the employer's ability to effectively and efficiently integrate
applicants and employees with disabilities in the workplace"); Hodges, supra note 47, at 611-12
(indicating that limited disclosure may in fact be advantageous to the employee with the disabil-
ity and noting studies that have shown that co-workers do not resent accommodations and often
volunteer to assist an employee with a disability when they are made aware of the
circumstances).
275. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (noting that the accommodation provided "does not have to
be the 'best' accommodation possible, so long as it is sufficient to meet the job-related needs of
the individual being accommodated").
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prejudice, unfounded fears, or lack of understanding. The accommo-
dation has had a negative impact on what co-workers are required to
do at their job on a day-to-day basis or to what privileges they are
entitled, and this is what can lead to a loss of morale. Lack of knowl-
edge regarding the reason for their treatment would undoubtedly ex-
acerbate the situation.276 However, disclosure may not have the
effect, as it would in the second situation discussed above, of alleviat-
ing all legitimate causes of the lowered morale. Thus, in this situation,
damage to morale may be unavoidable, and if so, it should therefore
be factored into the assessment of whether the accommodation im-
poses an undue hardship. 277 It must be remembered, however, that
the ADA is a remedial statute and that to show undue hardship an
employer must demonstrate significant difficulty or expense. It will be
an unusual situation in which damage to morale on its own will cause
the degree of disruption needed to satisfy the undue hardship
threshold.
VI. CONCLUSION
As has been demonstrated, making an accommodation to an em-
ployee with a disability, particularly when coupled with an inability to
disclose the reason behind the accommodation, can lead to percep-
tions of unfair or preferential treatment on the part of co-workers,
which, in turn, can lead to lowered morale. Because damage to em-
ployee morale can result in significant costs to an employer, employ-
ers have a legitimate interest in maintaining good morale and not
taking actions that would damage morale. This Article has addressed
the question of whether an employer's interest in maintaining good
employee morale and the costs created by lowered morale should be
considered in determining the extent of an employer's obligations
under the ADA.
In determining the proper role of morale under the ADA, two im-
portant concepts need to be kept in mind. First, the ADA's purpose is
276. See Hodges, supra note 47, at 605. In discussing conflicts that may arise between a provi-
sion in a collective bargaining agreement and an accommodation, Hodges notes that the union is
placed in a difficult position because, if it agrees to the accommodation, an employee disadvan-
taged by the accommodation may then file a grievance with the union. Id. She recognized that
this problem is exacerbated if the confidentiality requirements of the ADA prevent the union
from disclosing its actions. Id.
277. This result is supported by case law under Title VII, case law under the Rehabilitation
Act, and the EEOC's interpretation of the ADA. See Murphy, supra note 48, at 1632 (sug-
gesting that imposition on co-workers caused by reassignment of unpleasant job tasks and result-
ing feelings of unfairness should be considered by courts in determining whether
accommodation imposes an undue hardship).
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to eliminate animus, prejudice, and lack of understanding with respect
to individuals with disabilities. Second, Title I of the ADA attempts
to attain a delicate balance between the right of individuals with disa-
bilities to be employed and the right of employers not to be burdened
with substantial costs. Thus, Title I requires that employers make rea-
sonable accommodations to permit an individual with a disability to
perform the essential functions of a job but relieves an employer of
this obligation if the accommodations would cause an undue hardship.
The proper role of morale under the ADA should, therefore, be one
that does not frustrate the purposes of the ADA, yet, at the same
time, one that respects the rights of employers as well as individuals
with disabilities. The proposal offered in Part V of this Article accom-
plishes this goal. In those situations in which lowered co-worker mo-
rale is the result of animus, prejudice, or lack of understanding, the
proposal is that the lowered morale should never be a consideration,
regardless of the harm it may cause to the employer. To permit low-
ered morale to be a consideration under these facts would be to sanc-
tion implicitly the very attitudes the ADA is designed to abolish. In
all other situations, the suggestions provided by the proposal repre-
sent a balancing of the rights of individuals with disabilities and the
rights of employers. The proposal, therefore, furthers the purposes of
the ADA while, at the same time, bringing clarity and certainty to an
area that is at the moment fraught with obscurity. It is thus incumbent
on the EEOC to take whatever actions are necessary to incorporate
provisions consistent with the proposal into its regulations and
guidelines.
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